



CLIMATE CHANGE, LABOUR MIGRATION AND SUGARCANE PRODUCTION IN THAILAND: TOWARDS A MORE RESILIENT FUTURE

Migrant worker employed in agricultural farm in Mae Sot, Thailand. © IOM 2022/Javier VIDAL

KEY MESSAGES

- Sugarcane plantations in provinces along Thailand's borders with Cambodia and Myanmar employ large numbers of migrant workers from those two countries, including vulnerable farmers whose livelihoods have been severely affected by climate change. For these migrants, many of whom have lost their livelihoods and fallen into debt, environmental and economic migration drivers are inextricably linked.
- Thailand has memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with Cambodia and Myanmar, as well as a border pass system, providing regular paths for labour migration, but the costs and logistical challenges to access those regular channels, the short-term nature of employment in sugarcane, and the porous nature of the border lead many people to migrate irregularly.
- Migrant workers often bring their families with them – for instance, because there is no caretaker back home. In Thailand, migrant children often face barriers to accessing education, and evidence of child labour was observed on the plantations during this study.
- Migrant workers employed on sugarcane plantations live and work under precarious conditions and are highly vulnerable, particularly if they lack proper documents. Their jobs can be unsafe, they may work long hours for well below minimum wage, and they may lack recourse against exploitation or abuse. Worksite inspections, to the extent that they occur, seem not to identify these issues.
- The low wages and the conditions under which migrant workers in the sugarcane sector work limit how much they can use their time in Thailand to improve their socio-economic situation or make investments that enhance their resilience to climate change in their origin communities.
- Reforms are needed to ensure that migrants vulnerable to climate change can obtain decent work in Thailand and can successfully use migration as an adaptation strategy that improves their well-being. This brief recommends reviewing the use of the border employment scheme and strengthening legal protections for agricultural workers, providing incentives and support to small and medium-sized enterprises and smallholder farmers, to facilitate adoption of best practices, and using collaborative approaches to monitor working and living conditions.

Thailand is the wealthiest and most developed country in the Greater Mekong Subregion,¹ and a top destination for migrant workers, with about 2.4 million registered as of December 2022, including 1.7 million from Myanmar and 460,000 from Cambodia.²

People from Cambodia and Myanmar have long come to Thailand both to work and to flee violence and political instability. Climate change is creating yet another reason to leave, as both countries face major impacts: from disasters linked to cyclones, torrential rains and floods, to sea-level rise, to more frequent and severe droughts. For people who were already poor and vulnerable, these impacts can be devastating, ruining their livelihoods and destroying their assets. Thailand faces many of the same physical hazards, but, as shown in Table 1, for several reasons, it is far less vulnerable, with a greater readiness to adapt.

Table 1. Income, economic diversification, climate vulnerability and adaptation readiness in Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar

	GDP per capita (2021, current US\$)	Agriculture share of GDP (% , 2021)	ND-GAIN rankings (2022)	
			Vulnerability	Readiness
Cambodia	1,591	22.8	50 th	164 th
Myanmar	1,187	23.5	35 th	164 th
Thailand	7,233	8.5	85 th	62 nd

Notes: All these indicators are imperfect proxies, but they provide valuable context. GDP per capita indicates the level of wealth and economic development in a country, while the share of GDP from agriculture (as well as forestry and fishing, which are included in these figures) provides an indication of how much a country has diversified its economy, and also highlights the extent to which people depend on highly climate-sensitive activities for their livelihoods. The Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Index measures a total of 181 countries. For vulnerability, higher rank means the country is more vulnerable to the effects of climate change. For readiness, higher rank means the country is more able to leverage investments and convert them to adaptation actions.


Sources: World Bank and ND-GAIN.³

This policy brief summarizes the findings of a joint study by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Stockholm Environment Institute that examined links between climate change and international labour migration.⁴ In Thailand, the study focused on workers from Cambodia and Myanmar employed by smallholder farmers on sugarcane plantations in Sa Kaeo and Tak provinces. The purpose of this brief is to provide insights to the Royal Thai Government on the conditions under which workers are migrating, their experiences in Thailand, and the implications of their migration for climate resilience and human well-being. The brief also provides recommendations to strengthen policies and suggests potential ways to improve business practices. Figure 1 provides an overview of the research approach, which also involved an in-depth review of the policy and academic literature.



Migrant workers on their way to farm factory in Mae Sot, Thailand. © IOM 2022/Javier VIDAL

Figure 1. Overview of research sites (in blue) and migrants' origin communities (in green), and summary of research



Key informants interviewed:	14 (7 men, 7 women, remotely)
Multi-stakeholder consultations:	24 participants (13 women, 11 men, remotely)
Migrants interviewed:	20 from Cambodia (13 women, 7 men), in Sa Kaeo; 25 from Myanmar (11 women, 14 men) in Tak
Employers and local authorities interviewed on site:	5 in Sa Kaeo, 5 in Tak

Sugarcane is the main cash crop in Thailand, grown on more than 1.8 million hectares of land as of 2020.⁵ The country exported an estimated USD 1.83 billion in cane sugar in 2020, second only to Brazil.⁶ The Royal Thai Government has strongly encouraged farmers to grow sugarcane as an alternative to low-productivity rice cultivation. Sugarcane is also central to Thailand's national bioeconomy strategy, which envisions its use in ethanol production, chemicals and pharmaceuticals.⁷

Thailand's sugar sector, including growers, millers and associated personnel, employs more than 1.5 million people and generates about USD 6 billion per year.⁸ Smallholders are crucial to the sector: 70 per cent of production is on farms of less than 10 hectares.⁹ Sa Kaeo and Tak are among the top-producing provinces, and they are also key destinations for migrant workers from Cambodia and Myanmar.¹⁰ In both provinces, environmental degradation and climate change impacts – such as rising temperatures, extreme heat, droughts and floods – are putting a strain on sugarcane production. At the same time, sugarcane plantations have considerable environmental impacts, especially through land conversion and through open burning of the fields prior to harvest.¹¹

ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DRIVERS OF MIGRATION ARE INEXTRICABLY LINKED

All interviewed migrants had experienced environmental impacts in their countries of origin that deepened pre-existing vulnerabilities and often forced them into debt. Most workers from Myanmar came from the Bago region, where several floods and droughts have occurred; others came from Kayin State and Ayeyarwady region (see Figure 1). The Cambodian migrants interviewed came mainly from Banteay Meanchey province, followed by Siem Reap, Battambang and Oddar Meanchey – all traditional rice farming areas that have seen some of the greatest reductions in rainfall in Cambodia.

Almost all the migrant workers earned a living through farming in their own countries prior to migrating to Thailand, and they faced multiple environmental hazards. They described frequent and severe floods that had major impacts on their access to natural resources, livelihoods, incomes and even food security. Houses were also inundated and damaged. Droughts were widely mentioned as well. There are multiple ways to adapt, such as through irrigation and water management, switching crops and diversifying their livelihoods.¹² However, farmers also face many barriers, including poverty, lack of access to technology and to markets, knowledge gaps and limited government support.

The migrants also spoke of the impacts of business activities and infrastructure development, such as constructions of dams and roads, in their communities of origin, which sometimes degraded the landscape and limited their access to key resources, especially water. Asked why they migrated, most cited socio-economic factors (often linked to environmental impacts) and pressures as the primary reasons: seeking better jobs to earn more money for their families and pay off debts. The political situation in Myanmar and the COVID-19 pandemic were also important migration drivers.

THE CONDITIONS OF MIGRATION MAKE WORKERS HIGHLY VULNERABLE

Growing sugarcane production in Thailand has increased demand for migrant workers, especially in smallholder farms along the borders with Cambodia and Myanmar.¹³ In the early 2000s, Thailand adopted memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar to regulate migration, which have been updated since. The 2017 Royal Ordinance Concerning the Management of Employment of Foreign Workers, B.E.2560, and its amendment in 2018 establish the MOU process as the only official channel to enter Thailand for relatively long-term employment in lower-wage occupations. For shorter-term engagements, Section 64 of the Royal Ordinance facilitates the temporary employment of migrants in designated border provinces.


Through the border employment scheme, Thai employers in designated provinces bordering Cambodia and Myanmar (see Figure 2) may hire workers from designated border areas in their respective countries for seasonal or daily jobs. Workers who wish to participate must obtain a border pass with a visa, at a cost THB 1,375 (about USD 40), which includes the application fee, a work permit for up to 90 days, a medical certificate, and health insurance for three months. They can only stay for 30 days at a time, however, then must return to their country and re-enter Thailand to resume work. However, employment opportunities in Thailand's sugar sector typically extend for five to six months, and some workers stay longer to clean the fields or perform other duties.¹⁴

Border pass holders are not allowed to go outside the province where they were authorized to work, and some provinces restrict their movement to the district level. The border employment scheme is also cumbersome for employers, as they need to travel frequently to the district offices to obtain relevant documents.¹⁵ Moreover, the short-term nature of these jobs limits border pass holders' access to social protection, and the authorities have limited capacity to monitor whether some workers should be designated as regular employees instead of being hired for 90 days at a time.



Agricultural farm in Mae Sot, Thailand. © IOM 2022/Javier VIDAL

Figure 2. Areas of Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar covered by Thailand's border employment scheme



Source: Reproduced from Figure 1 in IOM, 2021.¹⁶

Notes: Only people living in the areas marked in darker colours in Myanmar and Cambodia may use the border employment scheme, and they may only legally work in the Thai provinces marked in dark green. This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

The MOU process, on the other hand, is too costly and complex for seasonal workers in the sugar sector.¹⁷ These workers often work for short stints on different farms, and thus change their employer frequently, while under the MOU process, a migrant worker can only work legally for one employer. In part because of this, many migrants enter Thailand irregularly and find it difficult to access legal protections.¹⁸ Recognizing the realities on the ground, the Royal Thai Government has undertaken periodic and ad hoc regularizations to enable irregular migrants to formalize their status and obtain official documents known as pink cards. Most recently, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Thailand offered a two-year amnesty (until February 2023) to irregular migrant workers from Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, and Myanmar, and their children.¹⁹

Many migrants still lack legal documents, and are thus unable to engage in formal employment. Among the Cambodians interviewed for this study, a large share had border passes or pink cards.²⁰ Those from Myanmar come from provinces that are ineligible for border passes, and all had migrated irregularly. Only one had obtained a pink card in Thailand. Some mentioned having borrowed money from family, relatives, neighbours or employers to cover migration costs.

WORKERS' EXPERIENCES OFTEN FALL SHORT OF THAI STANDARDS

Thailand has made efforts to promote responsible business conduct by enacting significant labour protection laws, most notably the Labour Protection Act B.E. 2541 (1998, last amended in 2019). However, in the agricultural sector, the Labour Protection Act only applies in full to workers who are employed full-time for at least one year. Seasonal agricultural workers are covered by reduced protections laid out in the Ministerial Regulation concerning Labour Protection in Agricultural Work, B.E. 2557 (2014). The latter provides protections such as paid sick leave, equal pay for equal work, maternity leave, a prohibition of child labour, and safe and hygienic living conditions. However, in practice, there is poor compliance, and inspections fail to identify and punish violators.²¹

In addition to enacted labour laws, Thailand has also ratified several, though not all, International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions and protocols,²² and promotes the localization of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) through a National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights. The National Action Plan seeks to prevent, address and remedy human rights abuses committed in business operations, including on migrant workers and through environmental destruction.²³ Thailand is in the process of drafting its second National Action Plan, aiming to put the principles into practice and emphasize the responsibility of private sector actors under the UNGPs. However, both the UNGPs and the National Action Plan are non-binding.

Separately, the Royal Thai Government has signed the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and is a “Champion country” for its implementation,²⁴ and it has made substantial commitments under the Paris Agreement, describing climate action as a “high priority”.²⁵

Conditions on the ground do not always match the Government’s ambitions, however. The migrants interviewed in this study described exploitative and abusive working conditions, such as 10–14 hour workdays and wages below the legal minimum. As noted earlier, they tend to be employed only for short stints, during which they work intensively. The migrants said they started at 6 or 7 a.m. and finished between 5 and 10 p.m. Some deliberately worked into the night to maximize their earnings. A previous study that surveyed 195 migrants on Thai sugarcane plantations found most worked 9–12 hours per day.²⁶

In Tak province, migrants from Myanmar, all irregular, said they were paid THB 10.50–17 (USD 0.30–0.50) per bundle of cane harvested (10–12 canes each). While this is a common business practice, the piece-rate system pushes migrants to work excessively long hours. Even then, the migrants interviewed often failed to earn the Tak provincial minimum daily wage – THB 315 (USD 8.50) at the time.

Most of the Cambodian migrants interviewed in Sa Kaeo, meanwhile, said they were paid biweekly and received salaries equivalent to THB 250–300 (USD 7–8) per day. Some reported earning THB 130–230 (USD 3.50–6) per bundle of 100 canes. Workers who sprayed chemicals or drove trucks reportedly got an extra THB 50 (USD 1.40) per day. Still, their earnings also often fell below the provincial minimum wage.

The use of pesticides and fertilizers, in turn, can harm workers’ health, especially as some said they had no personal protective equipment, nor had they been taught how to use it. One reported almost dying from exposure to herbicide. The long-standing practice of burning fields before the harvest poses particular threats to workers’ health.²⁷ The Royal Thai Government has imposed measures to minimize sugarcane burning, including through a programme to “reach zero burning” by 2023–2024 that included a subsidy of THB 6 million (USD 192 million) for distribution in 2020–2021 to discourage burning and thus reduce air pollution.²⁸ However, small-scale farmers interviewed said they had few alternatives.

Increasingly, climate change is posing its own challenges. Floods have disrupted work on some sugarcane fields, preventing the harvest – and thus depriving workers of an income. Migrants also described high heat and heavy rain that affected their ability to work.

MIGRANTS ARE ISOLATED AND LIVE IN PRECARIOUS CONDITIONS

Smallholder farms commonly provide free on-site housing for the migrant workers they employ. This is how most migrants interviewed for this study reported living. However, the physical isolation makes them dependent on their employers. The researchers observed the migrants’ precarious living conditions – often open-air structures that leaves them exposed to inclement weather.

Migrants’ movements are also constrained, particularly if they lack proper documentation, as they risk arrest and deportation if caught. When they do go out, many reported experiencing discrimination. A 2019 study found that a large share of the public in Thailand has negative views of migrant workers.²⁹ Anti-migrant prejudices often led people to condone discrimination, exploitation and even violence. Perceptions of migrants were found to vary based on their nationality, ethnicity, race, language, gender, marital status, age, education, and other factors. Women migrants are particularly vulnerable to abuse and harassment.

Living in such conditions is inherently stressful and can be traumatic. Extensive research in Southeast Asia and globally has shown that migrants often experience anxiety and depression, especially if they do not have support networks in the destination country.³⁰ Family separation also takes an emotional toll – both for migrants and those left behind. Many workers interviewed for this study had brought their families with them, however. The research team witnessed a different problem: child labour, particularly in Sa Kaeo.

Overall, the findings of this study suggest that not all sugarcane farms are complying with Thailand’s laws and regulations, and labour inspections may not be effective enough.

Amid growing global concern about the social and environmental impacts of agricultural commodity production, several private codes of conduct and certification schemes and multi-stakeholder initiatives that include human and labour rights standards have emerged. While these schemes set uniform (labour) standards across jurisdictions and can enable buyers to choose socially and environmentally sustainable suppliers, they have limitations. For example, they may only cover a company's direct production, not what it purchases from others. The costs and logistical challenges of compliance can also put certification out of smallholders' reach.

MIGRATION UNDER PRECARIOUS AND UNSAFE CONDITIONS DOES NOT REDUCE VULNERABILITY IN ORIGIN COUNTRIES

The most direct way in which migration affects development and climate resilience in migrants' communities of origin is through economic remittances. The World Bank estimates that in 2021, remittances to Myanmar totalled USD 2 billion, and to Cambodia, USD 1.2 billion.³¹ However, given their meagre earnings, the workers interviewed reported sending fairly little: an average of USD 25 to Myanmar (about 21 per cent of earnings) and USD 67 to Cambodia (about 32 per cent).³²

Asked how the money they send back is used, the migrants interviewed said largely to fulfil immediate household needs, such as buying food, paying for education and health care, and paying off debts. They also mentioned that remittances helped their family members avoid incurring new debts after environmental shocks. However, a study in Cambodia found the extra money from remittances might not even offset the impact of losing farm labour for some rural households.³³ If the goal is to make a lasting impact on human well-being and boost resilience to climate change, migrants need to earn enough money to invest in their future, such as by buying land and farm equipment, improving their homes, and educating their children.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

- Recognize climate change adaptation as a transboundary challenge³⁴ and engage with Cambodia and Myanmar and through regional forums to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration for people from areas facing climate impacts, and to establish a comprehensive policy framework on sustainable return and reintegration. Thailand can also help these neighbouring countries to build resilience in those areas.
- Recognize that migrants are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts within Thailand, and explicitly integrate them in the country's resilience-building efforts, starting with the priorities of the National Adaptation Plan.
- Adopt the recommendations of the ILO's May 2022 report on migrants in Thailand's agriculture sector,³⁵ which identifies measures to (1) increase access to safe and regular migration; (2) ensure safe and fair recruitment; (3) improve labour protections; (4) ensure effective collective bargaining and access to justice; (5) increase access to social protection and health services; and (6) improve occupational safety and health, housing standards and children's welfare.
- As a key first step towards protecting the most vulnerable migrants, expand opportunities for regularization for those who entered irregularly, and simplify the process for doing so. In parallel, amend the border employment scheme as advised by the ILO, to allow for longer stays and enhance protections for workers – and thus uphold the principle of equality. In addition, expand the scheme to cover all provinces of Myanmar that border Thailand, as climate shocks and overall conditions there are driving significant distress migration.
- Amend the Ministerial Regulation concerning Labour Protection in Agricultural Work so that all agricultural workers are covered by the key provisions of the Labour Protection Act – regardless of their migration status, and enhance inspections to enforce these provisions. Given the extreme vulnerability of many irregular migrant workers, however, particularly those from Myanmar, in some contexts it may be better for local authorities to partner with civil society and non-governmental organizations to evaluate working and living conditions on sugarcane plantations in a manner that does not put migrants at risk of arrest or punitive dismissal. To enhance migrant workers' access to remediation when violations occur, it is also recommended to ensure that State-based grievance mechanisms are accessible to all migrant workers, irrespective of migration status.
- Provide positive incentives to the private sector, such as technical assistance for employers, including small and medium enterprises, to learn about the UNGPs and how to comply, as well as support for integrating the principles into their corporate social responsibility and climate commitments.
- To strengthen Thailand's National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights, include a mix of mandatory and voluntary measures, instead of voluntary measures only, in line with guidance provided by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights.³⁶
- Carefully review the human rights due diligence requirements of trade partners such as the European Union, and proactively address any human rights concerns, so that companies can continue to export their products into these jurisdictions. This is particularly timely in the context of the recently approved EU–Thailand Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.³⁷

ENDNOTES

- 1 See Table 1, as well as World Bank data on GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) across the region: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=TH-MM-KH-VN-LA>. Thailand also ranked 66th on the 2021 Human Development Index, qualifying as a country with “very high” human development, while Cambodia was 146th and Myanmar, 149th, both rated as having “medium” human development UNDP. 2022. “Human Development Report 2021/2022.” New York: United Nations Development Programme. <https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-2021-22..>
- 2 Department of Employment. 2022. “Statistics on the Number of Foreign Workers Permitted to Remain in the Kingdom of Thailand, October 2022 [in Thai].” Bangkok: Office of Foreign Workers Administration. https://www.doe.go.th/prd/assets/upload/files/alien_th/9412bdc28b9d24aa32d9f2bd07c85619.pdf.
- 3 See World Bank data for GDP per capita (current US\$): <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=BD-KH-ID-MM-MY-TH>, and for agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP): <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=BD-KH-ID-MM-MY-TH>.
The ND-GAIN Country Index, last updated in July 2022, is available at <https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/>.
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- 5 Data from FAOSTAT, based on official data: <https://www.fao.org/faostat>.
- 6 See Observatory for Economic Complexity data for Thailand: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/tha> and for cane sugar (note that these data are for 2018): <https://oec.world/en/profile/sitc/cane-sugar>. In 2018, Thailand accounted for 14.7 per cent of cane sugar exports by value.
- 7 Sawaengsak, W. et al. 2019. “Development of a Social Impact Assessment Method and Application to a Case Study of Sugarcane, Sugar, and Ethanol in Thailand.” The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment 24 (11): 2054–72. doi:10.1007/s11367-019-01624-8.
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- 10 IOM. 2019. “Thailand Migration Report 2019.” Bangkok: International Organization for Migration. <https://thailand.un.org/en/50831-thailand-migration-report-2019>.
- 11 Sawaengsak, W., J. Prasara-A, and S.H. Gheewala. 2021. “Assessing the Socio-Economic Sustainability of Sugarcane Harvesting in Thailand.” Sugar Tech 23 (2): 263–77. doi:10.1007/s12355-020-00888-x.
- 12 Shaw, R. et al. 2022. “Asia.” In Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, edited by H.-O. Pörtner et al. Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press. <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/>.
- 13 This section draws heavily on a 2021 IOM report, informed by a recent review by the International Council of Jurists, as well as official information from the Royal Thai Government, as provided in the Work Permit Manual on Foreign Workers for Employers/ Business Establishments (in Thai): https://www.doe.go.th/prd/assets/upload/files/alien_th/96dd0f4c136f52018cc9700f067f0377.pdf.
See: IOM 2021. “Thailand Social Protection Diagnostic Review: Social Protection for Migrant Workers and Their Families in Thailand.” Bangkok: International Organization for Migration. <https://publications.iom.int/books/thailand-social-protection-diagnostic-review-social-protection-migrant-workers-and-their>.
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- 14 Manivong and Bourgois, 2017, “White Paper: Thai Sugarcane Sector & Sustainability.”
- 15 Musikawong, S. et al. 2022. “Working and Employment Conditions in the Agriculture Sector in Thailand: A Survey of Migrants Working on Thai Sugarcane, Rubber, Oil Palm and Maize Farms.” RAS/15/05/AUS (originally issued in 2021). Bangkok: International Labour Organization. https://www.ilo.org/asia/publications/WCMS_844317.
- 16 IOM has estimated the number of irregular migrant workers in Thailand at 2.3 million. See IOM, 2021, “Thailand Social Protection Diagnostic Review: Social Protection for Migrant Workers and Their Families in Thailand.”
- 17 The fees and costs associated with the MOU process are about USD 278, or about one and a half months of the minimum salary for Cambodian migrants and around four months of the minimum salary for Myanmar migrants (whose wages, as described below, are typically lower).

- 18 IOM, 2021, "Thailand Social Protection Diagnostic Review: Social Protection for Migrant Workers and Their Families in Thailand."
- 19 Charoensuthipan, P. 2021. "More Rules for Illegal Migrant Amnesty." Bangkok Post, January 5. <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2045543/more-rules-for-illegal-migrant-amnesty>.
- 20 A few had used the MOU system, and one said he had both a border pass and MOU documentation.
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- 22 See https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::no:11200:p11200_country_id:102843.
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- 24 See <https://migrationnetwork.un.org/champion-countries> and United Nations. 2018. "Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration." Marrakech. <https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact>., and Thailand is a "Champion country" for the compact's implementation.
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- 26 IOM, 2019, "Thailand Migration Report 2019."
- 27 Sawaengsak, Prasara-A, and Gheewala, 2021, "Assessing the Socio-Economic Sustainability of Sugarcane Harvesting in Thailand."
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- 30 Reza, Md.M., T. Subramaniam, and M.R. Islam. 2019. "Economic and Social Well-Being of Asian Labour Migrants: A Literature Review." *Social Indicators Research* 141 (3): 1245–64. doi:10.1007/s11205-018-1876-5.
- 31 See Ratha, D. et al. 2022. "Migration and Development Brief 36: A War in a Pandemic – Implications of the Ukraine Crisis and COVID-19 on Global Governance of Migration and Remittance Flows." Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. <https://www.knomad.org/publication/migration-and-development-brief-36>.
- 32 For migrants from Cambodian and Myanmar, the monthly salary used to calculate these percentages is based on secondary data by ILO (2021) in the sugarcane sector. The average monthly income of Cambodian migrants was THB 7688.4 (USD 207) and Myanmar migrants was THB 4378.5 (USD 118), according to the report.
- 33 Jacobson, C. et al. 2019. "When Is Migration a Maladaptive Response to Climate Change?" *Regional Environmental Change* 19 (1): 101–12. doi:10.1007/s10113-018-1387-6.
- 34 This is the focus of the Adaptation Without Borders partnership, co-led by the Stockholm Environment Institute. For an introduction to transboundary adaptation issues in Asia, see: Hocquet, R. 2020. "Transboundary Impacts of Climate Change in Asia: Making a Case for Regional Adaptation Planning and Cooperation." Adaptation Without Borders, October 6. <https://adaptationwithoutborders.org/knowledge-base/transnational-climate-impacts/transboundary-impacts-of-climate-change-in-asia>.
- 35 Musikawong et al., 2022, "Working and Employment Conditions in the Agriculture Sector in Thailand: A Survey of Migrants Working on Thai Sugarcane, Rubber, Oil Palm and Maize Farms."
- 36 UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights. 2016. "Guidance on National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights." Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Business/UNWG_NAPGuidance.pdf.
- 37 See https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-union-and-thailand-initial-partnership-and-cooperation-agreement_en.



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