Youth on the move in Somalia: Perspectives, Vulnerabilities, and Horizons

Prolonged and recurring humanitarian crises in the East and Horn of Africa (EHoA) region have forced millions of people to flee their homes in search of safety both within and across borders. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as of 2021, the East and Horn of Africa (EHoA) region has been hosting 13.2 million forced migrants, with 9.6 million being internally displaced and 3.6 million being refugees and asylum seekers. It is worth noting that this figure represents a significant increase if compared the numbers recorded in 2019 and 2020, which were 6.3 million and 6.5 million for internally displaced people, respectively. This recent upsurge in forced migration can be primarily attributed to factors such as conflict, violence, political persecution, and the intensifying impact of climate-related hazards, including droughts and floods.

Somalia, situated in the EHoA region, grapples with the intricate interplay of climate change and conflict. This has triggered a significant surge in migration flows, especially in the aftermaths of recent droughts and tense political dynamics. In 2021, the country found itself at a crucial crossroads for migration patterns. Somalia experienced a significant outmigration flow (160,432 individuals) alongside a substantial influx of migrants (121,095 individuals) making their way into the country during the same year. These migrants predominantly hail from neighbouring Ethiopia, which in 2019 witnessed a sharp increase in displacement due to violence escalation in the country.

Youth Are Part of Those Migrating in Somalia

At the heart of this migration phenomenon lies the youth. In 2021, 33 percent of the migrants registered by the IOM Flow Monitoring Points (FMPs) in Somalia fell within the 18 to 29 years age group. Despite being a significant proportion of the migrant population, young people face several challenges, such as the lack of employment opportunities, increased exposure to violence and conflict risks, and growing marginalization in society. As a result, it is not surprising that a substantial number of young   people opt for irregular migration patterns as opposed to more regular or organized alternatives. This trend becomes particularly apparent when zooming into the movements of semi-skilled and unskilled youth, who are on the lookout for employment opportunities, especially along the Eastern, Southern, and Northern Routes.

Addressing this crisis and safeguarding the youth from increasing vulnerability requires more than good intentions; it necessitates a deep dive into data analysis. But it's not just about crunching numbers; it's about uncovering insights that can shed light on the root causes and dynamics of youth migration, enabling targeted interventions and policies to safeguard the well-being of those caught   in the midst of these complex migration patterns. A concrete example of this approach can be found in Somalia, where UN OCHA and IOM joint forces to enhance IDP data collection. Their collaborative effort resulted in the formulation of the IDP Working Group Road Map, a two-year plan aimed at regularly updating IDP stock figures on a quarterly basis. This initiative not only bridges existing data gaps but also serves the vital purpose of gaining a deeper understanding of humanitarian information needs.

Data from Displacement Tracking Matrix's Flow Monitoring (FM) tool at major transit locations throughout the region is another important tool in this endeavour. In particular, the Flow Monitoring Surveys (FMSs) collect insightful individual socio-economic and demographic information of the travelers passing by those key transit locations.  In Somalia, the FMSs captured 61,491 individuals on the move between 2018 and 2023 , 38% of migrants fall within the 14 to 30 years age group. Around 70% of these young migrants are primarily unmarried males who were unemployed prior their departure.  Despite their adequate level of education, with 91% having completed at least the primary school and 51% having even attained secondary education, only a mere 17% had been employed before moving.  This underscores the pivotal role of the lack of job opportunities as a compelling reason driving young people’s decision to seek new horizons.

Middle East and Abyei Administrative Area Are Among the Main Destinations of Somali Youth

The Middle East and the Abyei Administrative Area emerge as the two prominent go-to locations. The migration trend toward the Eastern Route emphasizes the Middle East's allure as a thriving hub for opportunities and employment for young people, underscoring the relevance of labour migration among young individuals in their pursuit of a brighter future and enhanced livelihoods. On the flip side, despite recent surges in violence that have rendered Abyei unstable, migration patterns within EHoA also seems to gravitate toward Abyei, particularly among migrants originating from Ethiopia. Between 2021 and 2022, IOM documented over 52,000 total movements from Ethiopia towards the Northern Route, particularly South Sudan. Figure 1 provides a vivid visualization of these diverse migration patterns at play.

Figure 1: Circular migration Flow of people between 14 and 30 years old of age. Data source: IOM Flow Monitoring Surveys (FMSs). The flows are represented in absolute numbers and not weighted by countries’ population size.

Climate Change is Not a Primary Motivations for Somali Youth Migration, But a Compounding Factor

As we venture deeper into the reasons why young people moved in the first place, it becomes clearer that the livelihoods aspect plays a pivotal role. Approximately 61% of the above-mentioned FMSs’ sample decided to migrate due to economic reasons, followed by access to services and conflict. Surprisingly, only 6% of the young migrants mentioned environmental reasons as their motivation to move. This finding suggests that climate change and environmental degradation are not considered as primary reasons for moving, as opposed to economic and security concerns, which have a greater influence on the decision to move.  This is not a surprising finding, as migration is a multi-causal phenomenon, where multiple factors - demographic, political, social, environmental - contribute to form the decision to migrate. At the same time, the adverse impacts of changing climatic conditions can affect migration through indirect socio-economic channels, including a decline in job opportunities, agricultural output, and food insecurity. These indirect consequences may be the reasons why many  individuals do not recognize climate-related reasons as the driving force behind their decision to relocate.

Figure 2: Individual self-reported reasons to move between 14 and 30 years old of age. Data source: IOM Flow Monitoring Surveys (FMSs)

While economic motivations often take the spotlight as the primary driving force leading people to relocate, a closer examination of the data show that at least 5,153 out of 16,003 young migrants perceived themselves as forcibly displaced. To have a deeper understanding of the displacement dynamics, we run linear probability regression-based models to tease out the significance and quantify the contribution of climate, conflict, and economic factors to force migration. Figure 3 gives a visual representation of how climate and conflict, together with individual characteristics, can shape mobility patterns. Among the sample, the probability of being displaced increases when young individuals experienced disasters or slow environmental changes preceding their departure, indicating that climate change and variability can play a significant role in driving displacement. As expected, the presence of conflict is also highly linked with the likelihood of being forcibly displaced. On the other hand, economic motivations do not seem to positively affect the probability of displacement. This suggests that economic factors might not tell the whole story and  could be intertwined with other compelling reasons, such as conflict or disasters, which typically compel people to uproot their lives against their will.

Figure 3: Linear Probability model – Dependent variable: Forced Displacement. Main independent variables: Environmental & Conflict reason to move. Control Variables: individual demographic characteristics, country of departure Fixed Effect, year of departure Fixed Effect. Cluster Standard Error: Region of departure.

Three Recommendations for the Way Forward

In this ever-evolving landscape of youth migration across Somalia and the broader EHoA region, our data analysis provides valuable insights to intervene and support young people on the move with youth-responsive policies and interventions.

1. The first key recommendation stemming from our findings is to ensure young people have accessible, quality education, as well as on-site job opportunities that align with the skills of young people. This could help young generations build a brighter future in their home countries, thereby enabling youth to find meaningful employment opportunities. However, it is important to note that for these interventions to become a reality, the stability of the countries  in question is a crucial factor. Sustainable economic opportunities hinge on institutional efforts for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and the establishment of climate-resilient policies.

2. The second recommendation is to improve data analysis by integrating high resolution climatic, conflict, and migration data – particularly a particular focus on youth and the risks associated with this social group. By combining this data at the most granular level possible with socio-economic and individual migration information, we can gain valuable insights into the motivations behind individuals’ migration choices. Therefore, collecting data related to migrants' departure areas and timing is needed and strongly advice to improve the understanding of migration-related issues and guide policy makers towards informed decisions. Moreover, this data analysis should consider the specific needs and vulnerabilities of young migrants, who often face greater risks and challenges during their journeys as well as in their destinations. Youth are not only a vulnerable group, but also a potential source of resilience and innovation, and their voices and perspectives should be included in data collection and analysis processes.

3. The third recommendation, mainly directed towards researchers and policy makers, is to adopt integrated approaches to address migration-related challenges, and uphold the rights of young people in this process, particularly in regions marked by conditions of fragility and insecurity. Interdisciplinary collaborations and coordinated efforts among different actors and institutions engaged in climate change, migration, development and natural resource management are crucial for gaining a better understanding of the interconnected factors influencing migration, such as socio-economic disparities, climate change-induced environmental pressures, and security concerns. Indeed, recognizing the complexity of migration demands a shift from isolated studies to a concerted effort that takes into account the multitude of factors contributing to this phenomenon.

By implementing these recommendations, it will be possible to improve the understanding of how  climate change and conflict can interact with different socio-demographic settings in shaping population movements, and thus make a significant difference in the lives of young migrants, assisting them in navigating the complexities of migration while protecting their well-being and prospects.

About the authors:

Anna Belli is an economist at the Alliance of Bioversity and CIAT, at CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security. Her research primarily revolves around understanding the intricate interactions between climate change, socioeconomic and demographic factors, with a particular focus on their impact on human security. Anna's research expertise spans various areas, including identifying the gendered dimensions of climate-related security risks, examining the linkages between climate-induced migration and security, and evaluating the role of food and nutrition insecurity in the climate-conflict nexus. Based in Nairobi, Anna is actively supporting the regional CGIAR initiatives and establishing partnerships in East Africa. She holds an M.Sc. Double Degree in Development Economics from the Georg-August Universität of Göttingen and a BA in Development Economics and International Cooperation from the University of Florence.

Victor Villa is an economist at the Alliance of Bioversity and CIAT,at CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security. Victor's primary area of expertise lies in evaluating the impact of climate change on social security, focusing on context-specific drivers. By implementing spatial analysis techniques and innovative quantitative approaches, his works mainly focus on assessing and quantifying how climate change and variability may impact numerous social factors such as migration or conflict occurrence. He is currently based in Nairobi where is supporting the regional CGIAR work and partnership establishment in East Africa. He holds a M.Sc. degree in Spatial and Environmental Economics from Amsterdam's Vrije University. During his studies, he specialized in quantitative research methods, such as data management, econometrics, and spatial analysis, providing him with a solid foundation for his current work.

This article is part of the IOM Blog Series: Youth Voices on Migration, Environment and Climate Change

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